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revisiting interwar democracy and dictatorship
A fundamental theme in Michael Mann’s work is the origin of politi-cal regimes. From pre-historic times to the contemporary world and spanning centuries of human history, Mann’s books deal with the 
immense variety of regimes into which societies have organized themselves 
(Mann, 1986, 1993 and 2012). In this short piece, it is not possible to review 
Mann’s whole work on this subject. Instead, I will focus on his most recent 
argument, on the origins of modern democratic and fascist regimes in inter-
war Western Europe (Mann, 2012).
It was mainly after World War i that most European societies experi-
enced for the first time in their history the attempt to consolidate mass demo-
cratic regimes (exceptions are Switzerland in 1848 and France in 1877). Mass 
democracy is recent phenomenon, of the 1920s and 1930s, characterized by 
the simultaneously attempt to consolidate institutions like universal suffrage, 
parliamentary control of executives, basic freedoms (expression, association), 
corporatist consultation between workers, governments, and employers, and 
mass delivery of welfare services.
Still, post 1918 democracy became consolidated only in some countries. 
In Great Britain, France, Ireland, Scandinavia, and the Benelux countries 
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 democratic institutions were maintained and deepened. But they failed in 
Spain, Portugal, Austria, Germany, Italy, and the new nations of central-east-
ern Europe. Moreover, where democracy failed it was replaced by rightist 
ultra-nationalist mass regimes. What explains this variation? Mann argues 
that the combination of the political crisis of collapsing limited liberal regimes 
(e. g. Spain) and multinational territorial empires (e. g. Austria-Hungary) with 
the poverty and devastation caused by the war and the great depression gen-
erated polarized civil societies that ultimately doomed the consolidation of 
democracy.
In the cases that failed, civil society was violent and anti-liberal. First, 
important segments on the left (left wing parties and unions) became dom-
inated by revolutionary extremists, who between 1918 and 1922 sought to 
repeat the example of the Russian revolution. These were the cases of the failed 
revolutions in Germany, Hungary, and Austria, and the cycles of workers’ rad-
icalism in Spain and Italy. In the countries where democracy consolidated, 
socialist movements were dominated by reformist groups and doctrines, will-
ing to ally with centrist parties, whether these were liberals/agrarians (Scandi-
navia), republicans (France) or religious (Belgium, Netherlands). Second, the 
political right was also partly dominated by extremist anti-democratic move-
ments: paramilitary, war veterans, students, and middle-class professional 
organizations. In the societies where democracy survived these movements 
were of a quite small scale.
Still, the mere existence of these movements was not enough to bring 
down democracy. For this to happen, it was necessary that traditional elites 
(landowners and businessmen), represented in conservative and liberal par-
ties, as well as in the State (military officers; higher civil servants) tolerated 
and actively used right-wing movements in their strategies for keeping power. 
First, they used paramilitary groups as agents of labor repression in factories 
and in the countryside. Second, they brought fascist parties to government, 
and this was possible only when the political culture of traditional elites itself 
was deeply anti-democratic.
In fact, these patterns of civility – or lack of it – did not suddenly appear in 
the interwar period, but somehow continued earlier historical developments. 
The degree to which elites and civil societies were more or less civil or liberal 
was already established at least since the 1880s-‘90s (Mann, 1993). The war 
only accelerated trends that came from before. In the cases where democracy 
consolidated, traditional elites were already habituated to some degree of party 
and political competition before 1914. In these countries strong parliaments 
allowed elites to build parties able to reach the masses, thus gradually con-
ceding rights to workers and the popular classes in general. On the contrary, 
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in countries like Germany or Spain, conservatives and liberals were unable 
to establish party and electoral links with the masses before 1918. These were 
elites who were used to holding on to power through clientelistic networks 
and/or sheer repression. When the war terminated their regimes in 1918, they 
could not effectively compete with socialists and other pro-democracy groups 
in free elections. Accordingly, their solution not to lose power was to invite 
fascists to the government (Germany) or by sponsoring right-wing military 
coups (Spain).
Traditional elites were also carriers of very different nationalist ideologies 
since the late 19th century. In those countries where democracy triumphed, 
nationalism was permeated by liberal (United Kingdom) and even pacifist 
ideas (France) (Mann, 2012, p. 33; Mann, 1993, p. 580). Conversely, German 
nationalism, represented in organizations like the Pan-Germanic and Naval 
Leagues, was racist and militarist (Mann, 1993, p. 74). In sum, in Western 
Europe between the 1880s to the 1930s two very different civil societies 
emerged: one peaceful, liberal, and democratic; the other reactionary, milita-
ristic, and authoritarian.
According to Mann, these patterns of civil society correspond to distinct 
historical-geographic areas. The European northwest is liberal and demo-
cratic. The south, center, and east are authoritarian. And what was typical of 
the northwest was that for several centuries considerable economic and reli-
gious freedom (Protestantism) had already existed, which, according to Mann, 
facilitated the spread of liberal-constitutionalist ideas (Mann, 2012, pp. 326-
327).
Here Mann’s argument is less convincing. There are several cases which 
cannot be accounted for by his argument. Just to name a few, Ireland, for 
instance, both an economically peripheral area and one with a catholic popu-
lation did democratize in the interwar period. And it was in the protestant and 
economically highly developed areas of Germany where support for Nazism 
was stronger.
Still, the importance Mann gives to religious factors in his explanation of 
regime types is very valuable. As others have noted (Gould, 1999; Gorski, 1993; 
Rokkan and Lipset, 1992), political cleavages between the 17th and early 20th 
centuries were structured mainly around religious conflicts. As Mann him-
self notes for the case of England, the nineteenth-century House of Commons 
spent more time debating religion than issues related to economics or class 
(Mann, 1993, p. 85).
But the specific link through which religion related to regime building 
is still unexplored. I would argue that it was not necessarily their theological 
content or the degree of church dependency of the State authorities. There 
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are cases of successful democratization in both catholic (France, Ireland) and 
Protestant countries (Denmark). And state-protestant church fusion was high 
in countries where democracy took root (Sweden, England) and where it did 
not (Germany). In this respect, Mann’s work offers many clues and histori-
cal examples that seem to converge on the following idea: in the cases where 
democracy took root, national churches established after the reformation had 
an important liberal sector, with important segments of religious elites favor-
ing the defense of parliamentary powers and the interests of common folk as 
opposed to elites.
In England, for instance, the civic campaigns against slavery in 1807 and 
1833 were led by radical evangelicals, defenders of a theology of the equality of 
the souls (Mann, 2012, p. 31); and the liberal movement itself, responsible for 
the strengthening of the parliamentary powers and the extension of suffrage 
in 1832, was based on a network of working and middle class dissidents and 
Methodists (Mann, 2012, p. 299). In Scandinavia, pro-democratic liberal and 
agrarian parties were also rooted in the dissident churches to official Luther-
anism (Mann, 2012, p. 302). And in France, well before the 1789 revolution, 
enlightenment and rationalist principles had deeply penetrated the catholic 
hierarchy. Many archbishops declared not to believe in God and the lower 
clergy was known to stimulate among parishioners feelings of anti-hierarchy 
and anti-privilege (Mann, 1993, p. 178). In fact, recent research has shown 
how these ideas have contributed to the start of the revolution itself (Van Kley, 
1996).
In Germany, on the other hand, a highly conservative and pro-absolutist 
Lutheranism was consolidated (Mann, 1993, p. 235; see also Gorski, 1999). 
Later it would serve as the basis from which reactionaries and right wing 
nationalists would build modern conceptions of German national identity. 
As Mann argues, German nationalism linked Lutheran religious feelings with 
loyalty to a strong and militaristic state (Mann, 1993, pp. 243-244, 323).
What seems to be contained – but not yet fully develop – in Michael Mann’s 
work is the idea that long-run legacies of state-church relationships created 
representative institutions (e. g. parliaments or strong executives), notions of 
political legitimacy and of national identity which would serve as a legacy that 
would interact with the challenges of early twentieth-century democratization. 
Specifically, different patterns of civil society in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries are the product of the degree to which state-church relationships 
between the 17th and the mid-19th centuries democratized – or failed to do so – 
the different sources of social power and inequality (economic, ideological, 
military, and political; on the sources of power see Mann, 1986, pp. 1-33). 
The more state-church relationships of conflict and cooperation directly and 
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indirectly led to  parliamentarized regimes, weak militaries, more equitable 
property structures, and ideological pluralism and dissent, the greater would 
be the chances for the development of a democratic and liberal civil society 
between the 1890s and the 1930s.
REFERENCES
gorski, P. S. (1999), “Calvinism and democracy: The case of the Dutch Republic (1555-1787)”. 
In C. Lankowski (ed.), Breakdown, Breakup, Breakthrough. Germany’s Difficult Passage to 
Modernity, New York and Oxford, Bergham Books, pp. 1-33.
gorski, P. S. (2003), The Disciplinary Revolution. Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early 
Modern Europe, Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press.
gould, A. (1999), Origins of Liberal Dominance: State, Church, and Party in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press.
mann, M. (1986), The Sources of Social Power, vol. i, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
mann, M. (1993), The Sources of Social Power, vol. ii, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
mann, M. (2012), The Sources of Social Power, vol. iii, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
lipset, S. M., rokkan, S. (1992), “Estruturas de clivagem, sistemas partidários e alinhamentos 
de eleitores”. In S. M. Lipset, Consenso e Conflito, Lisbon, Gradiva, pp. 161-259.
van kley, D. K. (1996), The Religious Origins of the French Revolution: From Calvin to the Civil 
Constitution, 1560-1791, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Fernandes, Tiago » tiago.fernandes@eui.eu » Departamento de Estudos Políticos,
Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal.
fernandes, T. (2013), Commentary “Religion and politics: Revisiting interwar democracy
and dictatorship”. Análise Social, 209, xlviii (4.º), pp. 971-975.
